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8.11.2007

New Orleans Public Housing

Billy Sothern | In the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, New Orleans's ruling class is demolishing public housing to make way for private businesses and expensive condos.



The Nation -- "We finally cleaned up public housing in New Orleans. We couldn't do it, but God did."

-A Louisiana State legislator quoted in the Wall Street Journal in Hurricane Katrina's immediate aftermath.

"The buildings will be built around a court with play space for children and yard space for each living unit. . . . This arrangement not only provides light and ventilation but eliminates traffic hazards for children. The negro project will include a community building with provision for a nursery school where mothers may leave their small children while they are working, an assembly room and smaller meeting rooms, as well as the office of the administrator."

-Description of the planned St. Thomas and Magnolia Housing Project in a 1938 article in the New Orleans Times Picayune.

America's experiment with public housing started here in 1937 when, with the country's sails full of the optimism of the New Deal, President Roosevelt signed the loan to commence construction of the St. Thomas and Magnolia Housing Projects, the first authorized spending under Senator Robert Wagner's Housing Act.

This was a time when more than half the city's people were living in substandard homes due to a lack of affordable housing after the city's population swelled with people from across the South drawn by the possibility for work and opportunity during the Great Depression. These apartments and boarding houses were saturated with "desolation, despair, squalor, poverty, and frustration--the whole sordid and dangerous group of sinister elements that form the components of the slum," as the 1937 Report of the New Orleans Housing Authority described it. And the people who ran the government here and in Washington, DC, thought that our citizens deserved better than these slums, and were committed to changing the situation.

Now, seventy years later, after the largest natural disaster in our country's history destroyed tens of thousands of homes and led to a massive internal displacement, the city again finds itself in a housing crisis, with the city's poorest citizens again jammed into crumbling old shotgun houses with ever-increasing rents, while the less lucky remain far from home, stuck in Houston, Atlanta, Jackson, and elsewhere. But the St. Thomas is gone, victim of the wrecking ball by 2002. The Magnolia is mostly vacant and faces a similar fate as part of a new national experiment in public housing, one which seeks to raze housing projects across the country in favor of mixed-income housing for the supposed benefit of the poor.

The Times Picayune, on Tuesday, February 23, 1941, announced that the first family had moved into St. Thomas, the housing project reserved for needy whites, (the Magnolia was constructed for black New Orleanians) with the headline "Housing Project Being Occupied by New Tenants," and the lede, "The St. Thomas Street low rent housing project was transformed into home, sweet home Monday as families began moving into the recently completed buildings." In the pictures of the "first family" moving in to 707 St. Andrew Street, Mrs. Cecilia Booker and her children, John, Bettye, Sammy, Grace Lou, Henry, and Cecilia Oisonach, move furniture into the brick apartment building, build a fire in the fireplace, and examine the new 'electric refrigerator' in the kitchen." In every picture, the whole family is grinning widely. Their evident satisfaction reflected the realities of the housing available on the private market, dilapidated old homes with no running water, no bathrooms excepting backyards, and little light or ventilation in low rent neighborhoods with nicknames like Bedbug Row, The Buzzards, The Yellow Dog, Red Devil, and The Lizards.

I find it easy to believe that these smiles were for more than a photo-op. In recountings of my own family history, my mother still smiles when she talks about moving from a "cold water flat" with no bathroom on Dean Street in Downtown Brooklyn in the early 1950's to a housing project when she was a little girl. Now called the Clinton Hill Cooperative Apartments, my mother's former home has been privatized; one bedrooms are now selling for more than $300,000. This series of brick towers with small ceramic American flags above the front entrances was built in 1938 for the families of Navy Yard workers. "It was the nicest place I ever lived," she always says. It's the same smile on thirteen-year-old Grace's face, or nine year old John's. It's a smile that expresses the joy of no longer living in squalor, of having a proper home.

Today at 707 St. Andrew in New Orleans, there is a vacant lot. Around the lot are brand new, brightly colored, mock-New Orleans homes built by the KB Home Corporation and HRI Properties and a block away, a brick-faced Wal-Mart stands where people used to live. The single-family home for sale next to the lot where Mrs. Booker used to live is now for sale. But neither she, nor her successors who struggle to keep themselves and their families afloat, could afford the $330,000 asking price. A similar house will soon be built at 707 St. Andrew and the lot will have come full circle--from unimproved shotgun rental slum, to sturdy brick public housing in the midst of government and civic optimism, to defunded government albatross, to privately owned suburban tract home that, who knows, may someday be neglected and rented again if the neighborhood's fortunes fall.

The demolition of St. Thomas began in 2000 as part of the Department of Housing and Urban Development's Hope VI Program, a multi-billion-dollar plan to wipe the public housing slate clean and start afresh with mixed income housing built according to vaguely "New Urban" aesthetics in public private partnerships with large, for-profit developers. Demolition was only the last of a series of indignities that the brick row houses suffered. Sister Helen Prejean lived just outside the projects at Hope House, also on St. Andrew Street, and described the St. Thomas of the 1980's in the opening of her book, Dead Man Walking: "Not death row exactly, but close. Death is rampant here--from guns, disease, addiction." It was this palpable despair that opened the door to Hope VI. And now, with Hurricane Katrina having done the difficult work of evicting the thousands of tenants of New Orleans other projects, including the Magnolia, the powers that be have determined that these old buildings, many of which suffered little damage in the storm, should be torn down.

How these housing projects went from being the nicest place many people had ever lived to yet another source of woe for the poor is part of the story of the gutting of the common good in the second half of the twentieth century. First, integration following the Civil Rights Act led to white flight from public housing, which changed the complexion of the tenants to the point where there was little commitment remaining to provide the services and support that these communities needed. Second, local government officials took the now inadequate sums required to provide maintenance and, instead of doing what they could with them, wasted money and lined their own pockets with funds that could have made the difference between hard lives and miserable ones.

By the turn of the century, when I first walked through a New Orleans housing project for my own work (representing poor people facing the death penalty), I found it difficult to believe that the government could legally allow people to live in such squalor, with windows busted out on many units, with doors knocked in exposing interiors covered with graffiti, with children playing in trash strewn common areas overgrown with weeds taller than them. By this point, America had given up on the notion of the deserving poor in favor of view that identified the mostly working mothers that occupied the majority of these units as "welfare queens" having children in order to get bigger government checks.

Simultaneously, the Housing Authority of New Orleans was well on its way to a complete takeover by HUD due to decades of mismanagement, corruption, and cronyism. In this context, I suppose its not hard to understand how trust in our public institutions to provide housing for poor Americans had become so degraded that we gave the keys to the castle to private industry and retreated from the original values with which these old brick buildings had been built a half-century earlier.

Mindful of the fact that it took many years and a drawn-out legal battle to remove all the tenants from St. Thomas, business and political forces saw Hurricane Katrina as a unique opportunity to demolish New Orleans' housing projects without even having to evict the families who had lived there for years. With the tenants mostly far removed from the city, these interests quickly created plans to demolish four additional complexes, including the Magnolia, the St. Bernard, and the Lafitte. Each one defies the common notion of housing projects as architectural poverty warehouses, as they were all built in the 1930's and 1940's with "low scale, narrow footprint and high-quality construction" that "reflect a subtle understanding of the city's historical context without slavishly mimicking it," according to an article by Nicolai Ouroussoff, the New York Times architecture critic. These brick buildings, with tile roofs and detailed metal work, were constructed by some of the city's finest artisans, many of whom would later live in them. They are a far cry from the massive, inhuman, vertical towers that have been destroyed by Hope Six elsewhere. Ourousoff called the demolition of these buildings - from both social and architectural perspectives - "an absolute perversity."

While the demolition of the St. Thomas has provided a model for developers and HUD for replacing the city's public housing, it has simultaneously provided a cautionary tale for former public housing residents about their fatesshould their homes be destroyed. They watched more than 1,500 units of public housing replaced with a couple hundred for low-income people, with the rest priced at prohibitively expensive rents. They saw the corporation that manages River Garden, as the new St. Thomas development is called, repeatedly break commitments and contracts with previous tenants about their ability to return to their neighborhood.

They understood that the "redevelopment" of their neighborhoods was being done for a number of reasons, few of which had anything to do with providing them and their families safe, decent, and affordable housing. So, despite the difficulties of organizing people spread across the country, former tenants, along with grassroots community organizations, are actively and visibly protesting the fact that only about a quarter of the 5,000 units of pre-Katrina public housing are occupied, and are insisting that they be allowed to return to their homes. They have also lawyered up to prevent their homes--their toehold in a city where affordable housing is otherwise unavailable--from being demolished and reinvented.

Ultimately, the old brick buildings that served and then disserved generations reflect the rise and fall of civic responsibility, generosity, and optimism in American life. They aren't slated for demolition, as some people have claimed, because they would be cheaper to raze than repair or because they were designed in a way that thwarts positive community. They certainly aren't being demolished because they are poorly constructed; the houses that will replace them are mere movie sets by comparison. They are being demolished because we hate to see poverty in our midst. We are frustrated that our efforts to help the poor have failed, so we blame them, the homes we built for them, the policies, never fully implemented, that held out promise that we could help them simply because it was the right thing to do.

Something tells me that brightly colored homes, market forces, and the bull-dozing of fine old brick buildings are unlikely succeed where genuine, though half-hearted, efforts failed. At the very least, let's not add to the insults to poor, displaced, and homeless New Orleans families by claiming that we are trying to help them by mowing down their homes and sending them back to The Buzzards and Bed Bug Row.

8.05.2007

New Hope for Public Housing?

From Our Data Base archive
Issue #104, March/April 1999

New Hope for Public Housing?

Hope VI promises to rebuild lives and revitalize communities. But the specter of displacement looms large in its future.

America's hulking public housing towers have provided a shifting symbol through the years. When built, they symbolized a generous system, giving comfort to Americans who needed help finding shelter. They gradually transformed into the symbol of urban decay, and President Reagan stood in front of abandoned towers declaring that somehow the buildings themselves were responsible for crime, poverty, and crumbling infrastructure. Massive demolition projects followed, with images of the towers disappearing into clouds of dust, along with – it was promised – the ills of the urban poor.

For 2.8 million people, of course, these buildings are more than a symbol – they're home. The federal government's latest renewal effort, HUD's HOPE VI program, has spurred debate anew about how best to meet the needs of those who rely on housing subsidies to keep roofs over their heads. This multi-billion dollar program attempts to look at the problems of public housing communities holistically, to change the very structure – physical, social, and economic – of public housing.

Public Housing in "Severe Distress"

Congress appointed the National Commission on Severely Distressed Public Housing in 1989 to plumb the depth of the challenges facing the nation's public housing stock. The commission reported that 86,000 of the nation's 1.2 million public housing units were severely distressed, "because of their physical deterioration and uninhabitable living conditions, increasing levels of poverty, inadequate and fragmented services reaching only a portion of the residents, institutional abandonment, and location in neighborhoods often as blighted as the sites themselves." The report didn't indicate specific developments exhibiting these conditions, but the commission urged congressional action to remedy the situation.

The response came in the form of the Urban Revitalization Demonstration Program, legislation that sought to combine capital improvements with community and support services to transform the housing, communities, and families suffering from the conditions outlined in the commission's report. The program, which became HOPE VI, has been HUD's flagship public housing initiative since 1992. Touting HOPE VI as "more than bricks and mortar," HUD lays out five objectives for the program:

  • Changing the physical shape of public housing by replacing the worst public housing developments with apartments or townhouses that become part of their surrounding communities.
  • Reducing concentrations of poverty by encouraging a greater income mix among public housing residents and by encouraging working families to move into public housing and into new market-rate housing being built as part of the neighborhoods where public housing is located.
  • Establishing support services to help public housing residents get and keep jobs.
  • Establishing and enforcing high standards of personal and community responsibility.
  • Forging broad-based partnerships in planning and implementing improvements in public housing.
"It's hard to go into a city where they're not talking about how we brought down the high-rises and built beautiful communities," says HUD Secretary Andrew Cuomo. More than $3 billion has been divided among 104 grantees in cities around the country, to implement proposals that call for demolishing 47,856 public housing units, constructing 33,009, and rehabilitating 8,614 more. The plans also call for constructing 15,404 units that are not public housing, but are market-rate units, and units financed with the Low Income Housing Tax Credit. Another 8,130 mostly vacant public housing units are being demolished under 28 demolition-only grants. The totals equal a loss of nearly 23,000 public housing units, and of about 7,600 hard units overall. HUD uses a competitive application process to choose sites for funding, and funds are granted to those who demonstrate the most pressing need and offer the most innovative proposals. More HERE

A Decade of HOPE VI

Research Findings and Policy Challenges

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Permanent Link: http://www.urban.org/url.cfm?ID=411002

The nonpartisan Urban Institute publishes studies, reports, and books on timely topics worthy of public consideration. The views expressed are those of the authors and should not be attributed to the Urban Institute, its trustees, or its funders.

Note: This report is available in its entirety in the Portable Document Format (PDF).


Introduction

Launched in 1992, the $5 billion HOPE VI program1 represents a dramatic turnaround in public housing policy and one of the most ambitious urban redevelopment efforts in the nation's history. It replaces severely distressed public housing projects, occupied exclusively by poor families, with redesigned mixed-income housing and provides housing vouchers to enable some of the original residents to rent apartments in the private market. And it has helped transform the Department of Housing and Urban Development's (HUD) approach to housing assistance for the poor. This report provides a comprehensive summary of existing research on the HOPE VI program. Its central purpose is to help inform the ongoing debate about the program's achievements and impacts, and to highlight the lessons it offers for continuing reforms in public housing policy.

HOPE VI grew out of the work of the National Commission on Severely Distressed Public Housing, which was established by Congress in 1989. Congress charged the Commission with identifying "severely distressed" public housing developments, assessing strategies to improve conditions at these developments, and preparing a national action plan for dealing with the problem. Based on its investigation, the Commission concluded that roughly 86,000 of the 1.3 million public housing units nationwide qualified as severely distressed and that a new and comprehensive approach would be required to address the range of problems existing at these developments.

In response to these findings, Congress enacted the HOPE VI program, which combined grants for physical revitalization with funding for management improvements and supportive services to promote resident self-sufficiency. Initially, housing authorities were allowed to propose plans covering up to 500 units with grant awards of up to $50 million. The program's stated objectives were as follows:

  • to improve the living environment for residents of severely distressed public housing through the demolition, rehabilitation, reconfiguration, or replacement of obsolete projects (or portions thereof);
  • to revitalize sites on which such public housing projects are located and contribute to the improvement of the surrounding neighborhood;
  • to provide housing that will avoid or decrease the concentration of very low-income families; and
  • to build sustainable communities.2

Since 1992, HUD has awarded 446 HOPE VI grants in 166 cities. To date, 63,100 severely distressed units have been demolished and another 20,300 units are slated for redevelopment (Holin et al. 2003). As of the end of 2002, 15 of 165 funded HOPE VI programs were fully complete (U.S. GAO 2003b). The billions of federal dollars allocated for HOPE VI have leveraged billions more in other public, private, and philanthropic investments.

Evaluating HOPE VI

After a decade of HOPE VI, a wide range of constituencies—Congress, the administration, housing groups, local elected officials, resident advocates, and the media—are asking challenging questions about what all of the investment has accomplished:

  • To what extent has HOPE VI achieved its intended benefits?
  • What impact has HOPE VI had on the original residents, public housing sites, the neighborhoods in which developments are located, and the surrounding cities and metropolitan areas?
  • What impact has HOPE VI had on approaches to public housing development, management, and design?
  • On a more forward-looking note, what lessons does HOPE VI offer for public housing or for affordable housing policy more generally?

The nature of the HOPE VI program makes responding to these fundamental questions especially challenging. HOPE VI has not been "one program" with a clear set of consistent and unwavering goals. Rather, the program has evolved considerably during the past decade—in legislation, regulation, implementation, and practice. To an unusual extent, the program has been shaped more through implementation than by enactment. What was initially conceived as a redevelopment and community-building program evolved over time into a more ambitious effort to build economically integrated communities and give existing residents more choice in the private housing market. Because of the flexible nature of the program, local housing authorities have had tremendous latitude in how they chose to design and implement their local HOPE VI initiatives. It is impossible, therefore, to provide simple answers to general questions about programmatic effectiveness and "lessons learned." The response to such questions is usually another question: "Which HOPE VI program are you asking about?"

Owing to the unusual nature of the HOPE VI program, HUD has not—and probably could not have—carried out a single, comprehensive evaluation that would have examined all aspects of the program. In 1994, HUD initiated a "Baseline Assessment" of HOPE VI (Fosburg, Popkin, and Locke 1996) that was intended as the first step in an incremental evaluation process. This baseline analysis was followed by an "Interim Assessment" report (Holin et al. 2003). But these reports consist of case studies focusing primarily on HOPE VI sites and redevelopment plans; there was only a very minimal attempt to gather information about the original residents and no plan for tracking resident outcomes. As the program expanded, HUD added a requirement to the HOPE VI selection process that sites had to hire local evaluators, but the criteria for these evaluations were vague and there were no requirements that housing authorities collect specific types of performance measures. As a result, a lack of consistent data across sites has hindered national research on the program.

Further complicating the challenge of evaluating HOPE VI is the fact that the program was initiated at a time of enormous change in the broader public housing system. In many respects, HOPE VI has served as a laboratory to test new and often contentious ideas about public housing finance, management, and design. People's thinking about the performance and impact of HOPE VI is intertwined with their views on the evolution of federal housing policy more broadly, and their concerns about the future role of public housing in helping to address the needs of the poor.

In part because of the absence of definitive data and evaluation results, perceptions about the impacts of HOPE VI vary widely. Some people characterize it as a dramatic success, while others view it as a profound failure. There is no question that the program has had some notable accomplishments. Hundreds of profoundly distressed developments have been targeted for demolition, and many of them are now replaced with well-designed, high-quality housing serving a mix of income levels. HOPE VI has been an incubator for innovations in project financing, management, and service delivery. Some projects have helped turn around conditions in the surrounding neighborhoods and have contributed to the revitalization of whole inner-city communities. However, HOPE VI implementation has also encountered significant challenges. Some HOPE VI projects have been stalled by ineffective implementation on the part of the housing authority or conflict with city government. In others, developments were simply rehabilitated or rebuilt in the same distressed communities, with little thought to innovative design, effective services, or neighborhood revitalization.

Most seriously, there is substantial evidence that the original residents of HOPE VI projects have not always benefited from redevelopment, even in some sites that were otherwise successful. This can be partly attributed to a lack of meaningful resident participation in planning and insufficient attention to relocation strategies and services. As a consequence, some of the original residents of these developments may live in equally or even more precarious circumstances today.

Purpose of This Report

This report reviews the existing research literature on both the achievements and the challenges of the HOPE VI program. In addition, it draws upon a day-long symposium on the program's strengths and weaknesses, held in the fall of 2003, involving a diverse group of practitioners, policymakers, advocates, and researchers. This assessment comes at a critical time in the evolution of HOPE VI—and of public housing policy in general. In its FY 2004 and FY 2005 budget submissions, the Bush administration proposed eliminating funding for the program altogether, citing long delays between grant awards and the completion of the revitalization projects at many sites. Congress ultimately restored the program for FY 2004, but at a substantially lower level of funding.3

There is no doubt that housing authorities, cities, and industry advocates would prefer to continue the program. HOPE VI is currently the only major source of redevelopment funding, and many localities are pleased with their successes in replacing older projects that were blighting their communities with new, mixed-income developments. In contrast, advocates for low-income housing have been outspokenly critical of the program, pointing to sites where much money has been spent and little accomplished, and emphasizing the small numbers of original residents who have thus far been able to return to the revitalized HOPE VI sites. Yet, these advocates are now pushing to continue HOPE VI funding, though they are also pressing for extensive reforms such as greatly expanding the rights of original residents and formalizing their role in the redevelopment process (cf. Center for Community Change 2003, National Housing Law Project 2002).

This debate is not likely to be easily resolved, as it involves a number of highly contentious issues:

  • the appropriate targeting of limited resources for affordable housing;
  • the impact of HOPE VI on the larger affordable housing supply and the appropriate roles of the public and private sector in providing this housing;
  • the needs of residents who are being displaced, and the extent to which HUD and local housing authorities are responsible for addressing these needs;
  • how race and ethnicity limit choices and opportunities for public housing residents; and
  • what to do about "hard-to-house" public housing residents, including families with special needs (multigenerational households, large families, disabled residents), "lease violators" (with back rent payments, criminal histories, illegal residents on the lease), and residents with substance abuse or mental illness who are at risk of becoming homeless.

Research alone cannot resolve these issues, but this report seeks to help inform the ongoing debate by pulling together a wide array of research to address the critical questions about the program's achievements, impacts, and the lessons it offers for public housing policy. This is, by necessity, an early and limited assessment. Most projects are still undergoing redevelopment, and many new developments are not "seasoned enough" to allow for a definitive examination. For now, in the absence of a comprehensive evaluation, we draw on the considerable evidence available from targeted efforts to examine different aspects of the HOPE VI program. This evidence includes large-scale studies carried out by the Urban Institute on resident outcomes, Abt Associates' baseline and interim assessments, the recent attempts to assess neighborhood impacts by the Brookings Institution and the Housing Research Foundation, as well as the many smaller studies by local evaluators and related research on mobility and scattered-site housing.

In our view, this evidence strongly supports continuation of the HOPE VI approach as a way to improve outcomes for distressed developments, residents, and neighborhoods. The program has achieved substantial success; it has demolished some of the most distressed and destructive housing environments, replaced them with much higher-quality housing and, in many cases, with mixed-income communities. Many residents who relocated with vouchers are living in higher-quality housing in safer neighborhoods. Therefore, HUD should continue to operate a targeted redevelopment program that provides funds for both physical revitalization and supportive services. However, the evidence also points to the urgent need for reforms in the HOPE VI program if it is to realize its full potential to improve the circumstances of very low-income families and communities. In particular, assistance with relocation and supportive services should be strengthened, and new attention should be given to innovations such as "enhanced vouchers" that would provide long-term counseling and support to vulnerable families in conjunction with housing assistance.

Chapter 2 provides essential background for understanding the performance of HOPE VI, by describing the dreadful conditions in many central city public housing developments that led to the call for a radical new approach to public housing. Next, we offer a brief overview of fundamental changes in public housing policy that began in the 1990s and that influenced the evolution of the HOPE VI program. Chapters 4 through 7 discuss the outcomes of HOPE VI, focusing in turn on the public housing sites themselves, the original residents, services and supports for today's residents, and improvements in the surrounding neighborhoods. The report concludes with a review of key lessons learned, priorities for ongoing research, and implications for the future of HOPE VI and public and assisted housing policy more broadly.

Note: This report is available in its entirety in the Portable Document Format (PDF).